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Abstract
This paper aims to oﬀer a contribution to the empirical literature on
the links between ﬁnancial and economic development.
In the investigation of the ﬁnance-growth nexus for 18 non-OECD
countries plus Mexico and Korea, the paper ﬁrstly introduces an indicator
of restrictions on the establishment of foreign banks. Secondly, it links
ﬁnancial development the capital—output ratio rather than the level of
income per se, implicitly assuming that a sound ﬁnancial development
has to be relatively capital-intensive. Futhermore, a new procedure is
systematically applied to take proper consideration of crisis periods with
dummies.
The paper ﬁnds that in the long run ﬁnancial development relation-
ship most countries support the capital-output ratio speciﬁcation. Also,
”fairly liberal” countries show a negative contribution of ﬁnancial open-
ness to ﬁnancial development. The non-linearity between ﬁnance and
growth seems to be conﬁrmed by the growing elasticity of the capital out-
put ratio in relatively developed countries. Finally, some large countries
seem to support the endogenous growth hypotheses while most African
countires turn out as ”cursed”, since neither accumulation nor openness
can explain their growth (or, rather, lack thereof).
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11 Introduction
The empirical literature on the links between ﬁnancial development and eco-
nomic development/growth is wide and very diﬀerentiated and there is no single
way to classify it. Clustering the literature around some common themes one
can ﬁnd among the main researched topics:
• the importance ﬁnancial development in the process accumulation and
hence in economic development/growth
• the non linearity of the relationship between ﬁnancial and economic de-
velopment
• the relationship between trade- or ﬁnancial openness and economic devel-
opment/growth.
A cornerstone of empirical studies Rousseau - Sylla (2001) ﬁnd a robust cor-
relation between ﬁnancial factors and economic growth that is consistent with
a leading role for ﬁnance for 17 countries with data from 1850 to 1997. This is
further supported by Harrison-Sussman-Zeira (1999) who ﬁnd a feedback eﬀect
between the real and the ﬁnancial sector that helps to explain international dif-
ferences in ouput per capita. Luintel - Khan (1999) using the VAR technique
ﬁnd two cointegrating vectors identiﬁed as long-run ﬁnancial depth and output
relationship linking ﬁnancial and economic development. They also ﬁnd a neg-
ative contemporaneous correlation between the level of ﬁnancial development
(depth) and growth in per capita income in 7 out of 10 countries and a strong
positive correlation between the levels of ﬁnancial depth and per capita output
in all sample countries. Beck-Levine-Loayza (2000) in their panel studies for
77 countries from 1960 to 1995 conﬁrm an economically large and statistically
signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁnancial development and both real per capita
GDP growth and total factor productivity growth. In their study the positive
link between ﬁnancial intermediary development and both physical capital ac-
cumulation and private savings rates is however ambiguous since it is not robust
to alterations in estimations techniques and measures of ﬁnancial intermediary
development.
A tentative explanation of such puzzle might lie either in diﬀerences in long
run relationship and short-run dynamics on in the non-linearity of the relation-
ship itself that is therefore not signiﬁcantly picked up by standard estimation
techniques. In fact, Loayza - Ranciere (2002) with a regression with 17 coun-
tries ﬁnd a positive long-run relationship between ﬁnancial intermediation and
output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship. Also,
Deidda - Fattouh (2001) with a threshold regression ﬁnd a positive relationship
between the level of ﬁnancial depth and economic growth for countries with
high income per capita but no signiﬁcant relationship for lower-income coun-
tries which is consistent with the non monotonic relationship implied in the
model.
2On the relationship between openness and ﬁnancial development Rousseau
- Sylla (2001), with the ratio of trade to GDP as a dependent variable, show
that countries with more sophisticated ﬁnancial systems engage in more trade
and appear to be better integrated with other economies. Rappaport (2000),
comparing the open-economy and closed economy versions of a calibrated model
shows that openness to capital ﬂo w sc a u s e so n l yav e r ys m a l li n c r e a s ei nt h e
rate of per capita output growth. Alternative calibrations, which instead sug-
gest a large eﬀect of openness on growth, either generate strongly counterfactual
closed-economy series or depend on the unrealistic assumption that individuals
can borrow against future labour earnings. Also, on the more exquisitely ﬁnan-
cial side, Clarke-Cull-Martinez Peira (2001) through survey data and a database
on bank regulation and supervision ﬁnd that foreign bank penetration improves
ﬁrm’ access to credit. It is worthwhile underlining, however, that Buch (2000)
with both cointegration and regression analysis ﬁnds that liberalisig regulation
- EU’s single market program and the Basle Capital Accord in particular - have
had a positive impact on cross-border banking and the evidence is less convinc-
ing for capital account liberalisation as such.
In conclusion, the brief survey of the literature seems to support the view
that ﬁnancial development is linked to economic development/growth even if
in no linear fashion. Furthermore, ﬁnancial openness might be ”good” for the
economic development/growth but the diﬀerent empirical deﬁnitions used in the
literature are not able to support a robust case in favour of a positive eﬀect of
ﬁnancial openness on economic and ﬁnancial development.
In this paper the empirical analysis of the ﬁnance-growth nexus is attempted
within a cointegration framework. The cointegrating relations aim to describe
long run relationships between the level of ﬁnancial and economic development
rather than growth, even if the growth dynamics are implicitly considered in
the lag structure of the time series model. In line with the empirical literature
on ﬁnancial development and growth credit to private sector as a percentage of
GDP will be used as a ﬁnancial development indicator.
Secondly, as in Clarke-Cull-Martinez Peira (2001) and Loyaza - Ranciere
(2002) a composite indicator proxying ﬁnancial openness will be introduced as
an endxplanatory variable. Thirdly, given the volatility of variables for the
sample countries and the consequent need of using dummies a newly developed
speciﬁc technique has been used. And ﬁnally, in accordance with the simple
model sketched in section 2, the cointegrating equation describing the long run
equilibrium relation between ﬁnancial development and the ”the real economy”
will be speciﬁed with a role for the capital income ratio rather than income per
capita alone.
In what follows section 2 will specify the model, section 3 will brieﬂyd e -
scribe the data and attempt an interpretation of the stlylized facts around the
links between ﬁnance and growth in open economies. Section 4 will sketch the
cointegration methodology and results with a special reference to theoutlier de-
tection and estimation procedure. In section 5 the conclusions will be wrapped
up.
32M o d e l S p e c i ﬁcation
A non-linear relationship between ﬁnancial and economic development where
ﬁnancial institutions endogenoulsy emerge has a signiﬁcative tradition in theo-
retical models. The pillars of such models1 can be summarised in
• standard 2-period OLG structure where individuals inelastically supply
labour during the ﬁrst period of life and receive a salary which is partly
consumed and partly saved and the savings are deposited and receive a
real interest rate Rd
t
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t is an externality eﬀect associated
with capital accumulation ( i.e. β2,3 ≈ 1)and ψ is the exogenous pro-
ductivity coeﬃcient. The representative ﬁrm’s demand for loans bt stems














• ﬁrms have no capital endowment, they operate if and only if they are
externally funded,
• banks fund themselves by issuing deposit contracts to households and have
a ﬁxed set up cost and non-linear variable costs. The representative bank’s







c(z)btdz + E =
Z zt
0
[1 + c(z)]btdz + E (2.3)
where Dt are deposits, bt is the amount of loans per ﬁrm, zt is the bank’s
market size in the loan market and E is the ﬁxed amount of physical resources
consumed each period t to set up a bank.
Solving the model, an equilibrium relationship among the amount of credit
outstanding in the system bt, capital per capita kt and the real interest rate Rt
emerges and it is subsequently log-linearised as
lnbt − lnyt = β1,0 − β1,2 lnyt + β1,3 ln(kt)+β1,5 ln(Rt)( 2 . 4 )
1For details see amog others A. Dal Colle Stievano (2001) and L. Deidda - B. Fattouh
(2001)
4Therefore the credit/GDP ratio bt/yt should have a positive link with the
capital/output ratio (i.e β1,3 = −β1,2 and β1,3,β1,2 > 0) and also an explicit
positive relationship with the real interest rate.
In what follows for each country the estimation of a cointegration relation-
ship of rank 2 will be attempted aimed at estimating enriched versions of (2.4)
and (2.1) to take into account the eﬀect of ﬁnancial openness. ψ will be modelled
as ≈ (β2,0 + β2,5 ln(Rt)).
3 Data Desciption
Inasmuch as ﬁnancially open economies represent the focus of the analysis, the
20 countries for estimation have been selected among those analysed in M. Kono
- L. Shuknecht (1998) [KS98 from now] where a long enough time series could be
found in either in the May 2003 World Development Indicators [WDI03] or in
Heston-Summers-Aten (2001), [PWT6.1]. Ideally the sample for each country
includes 41 yearly observations from 1961 to 2001 of real income per capita
(YC), real capital stock per capita (KC), real interest rate (RR), credit to
private sector as a percentage of GDP (CR)a saﬁnancial development indicator
and the ﬁnancial openness proxy (OP). Details on sources and calculations for
each variable in each country are summarised in Appendix A.
CR h a sb e e nc h o s e nr a t h e rt h a nd e p o s i t so nG D Pb e c a u s eo fb o t hab e t t e r
ﬁt with the theoretical model chosen for reference and longer time series readily
available from WDI03 that would have minimised calculation errors. CR has
been similarly preferred to other frequently used measures of ﬁnancial develop-
ment such as M2/GDP since the focus of the estimation is the (hopefully) useful
role of money as technology to trasfer value and give way to investment rather
than money as a facilitator of exchange, which is best represented in M2.
The Restrictions on practices by Foreign Establishments (RFE) indicator is
derived by KS98 from the GATS Schedules2. GATS commitments are minimum
guarantees of market access or national treatment and current policy cannot
be reversed to standards below those subscribed in GATS agreements. The
value of the RFE indicator for China and Chinese Taipei has been assessed
following KS98 methodology. Restrictions on activities by foreign aﬃliates on
domestic funding, retail operations, equity limits and new licenses for China and
Chinese Taipei have been personally assessed in accordance to the respective
WTO documents3.T h eOP variable has been built as the (log of the) product
of a constant indicator (RFE) and trade openness in constant prices. RFE has
been rescaled in the construction of OP as so that maximum restrictiveness (i.e.
RFE = 4) lowers the impact of trade openness while minimium restrictiveness
increases it.
2The policy commitments are listed in the WTO Members’ Schedules of SpeciﬁcC o m m i t -
ments made at the end of the Uruguay Round in December 1993 and the updates following
the progress of global negotiations.
3See WTO (2002) for China and WTO (2001) for Chinese Taipei.
5It might be argued that in constructing the OP variable RFE indicators
have been associated with each economy’s trade openness in years well before
GATS agreements were actually signed by any of the sample countries and
therefore OP cannot properly act as a dummy for ﬁnancial openness.
Support for the use of OP throughout the sample length comes from at least
three lines of argument.
First of all, KS98 argue that the nature of GATS commitments may make
them more valuable than current policies, especially in emerging markets with
a volatile policy record, as proxies for ﬁnancial services trade policy restrictions
as perceived by market participants.
Secondly, since the average country has been member of pro-openness in-
stitutions such as the IMF and the WTO for more than half and two thirds
respectively of the standard sample period, it is argued that associating RFE
to the whole length of the trade openness series might indeed be considered as
a good proxy to the willingness of the country to liberalise the ﬁnancial sector.
Such hypothesis is also consistent with a follow-thy-client strategy by incumbent
banks originating from states exporting in each sample country.
And ﬁnally Loayza and Ranciere (2002), choosing to constrain themselves
to panel techniques, ﬁnd slope dummies - built as the product of the ﬁnancial
development indicator and a crisis indicator running throughout the sample
period - signiﬁcative and particularly useful to tame the roller coaster behaviour
of ﬁnancial variables in crisis-hit countries.
As to the quality of all variables, as shown in tables A2-A6, most of them,
with the exception of RR, are normally distributed and should grant quality esti-
mates. Problems might be detected for some Latin American and African coun-
tries such as Argentina, Chile, Egypt, Ghana, Mexico, Senegal and South Africa
(non normal KC and/or CR). For Chinese Taipei and Mexico a ﬁnancially-
closed economy speciﬁcation of the model might give better results rather than
a open economy one, given the detected non-normality in their OP variable.
South African data, in addition to shorter series suﬀer from non normality with
the exception of OP. Such bad quality does not bode well for the estimation
exercise.
[Table 1: Some summary statistics here]
Summarising, the sample will be composed by 20 countries, all, with the
exception of Korea and Mexico, non-OECD member. All of the countries are
member of the WTO though, and apart from Chinese Taipei and Egypt all are
subscribers to art. 84 the IMF statues. More speciﬁcally, the average country
has been a member of the WTO, or its predecessor, for over 30 years and of the
IMF for nearly 20.
4Article 8 sets forth the general obligations of each member with special reference to the
avoidance of restrictions on current payments and of discriminatory currency practices and to
the convertibility of foreign-held balance.
6As a ﬁrst assessment of the explanatory power of the main dependent vari-
a b l e sw i t h i ne a c hs a m p l ec o u n t r yt h em a i nc o r r e l a t i o n si nl e v e la n dg r o w t hr a t e s
with CR are shown in table 2.
[Table 2a: CR Correlations and Table 2b: YC Correlations here]
Legend:
∆X = annual growth rate of variable X
ρ(X,Z) = correlation of variables X and Z o v e rt h es a m p l ep e r i o d
Table 2a shows that the contemporaneous correlations between the level of
real income, or real capital per capita, and ﬁnancial development are positive
with the exception of Costa Rica, Ghana, Mexico, Senegal and South Africa.
Correlation with the levels of the capital income ratio is also positive but for
Chile, Costa Rica, Ghana, Mexico and South Africa. Correlation with open-
ness is positive with the exception of Costa Rica, Egypt, Mexico, Senegal and
Venezuela. Both in the correlation with KY and OP minus signs prevail, al-
though six countries show a positive sign. Correlation between CR and RR
is, on average, lower than that with other endogenous variables and positive
signs prevails and this support the interpretation of interest rates as a proxy for
technical progress and therefore as input in ﬁnancial development along capital,
income and, possibly, openness.
In the correlation between CR a n dg r o w t hr a t e s( i . e .∆YC, ∆K, ∆OP and
∆KY), negative signs prevail in the ﬁrst three cases, while correlation of CR
and ∆OP shows a split with eight negative signs and ten positive ones. In the
end a weak indication in favour of opposite sign relationships between ﬁnancial
development and real variables in the long vs. the short-term seem to emerge,
while no precise pattern for the relationship of CR and with OP seems visible
at this stage.
Table 2b shows the prevalence of positive signs in level correlation between
YC and either KC, KY or OP. Partial exception are the African countries,
except Morocco, and Chile and Venezuela. ρ(YC ,R R )i sl e s sc l e a r - c u tt h a n
that between CR and RR since positive and negative signs are equally split. In
correlation between YC and growth rates of the variables negative signs prevail
with the exception of ∆OP.
3.1 Stylised facts
Considering the World Bank income thresholds in real terms, to carry out in-
tertemporal comparisons, table 1 shows that in 1961:
• 9 countries were considered Low Income (YC< US$745): China, Egypt,
Ghana, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Philippines, Senegal and Thailand
7• 9 countries were considered Lower Middle Income (US$746<Y C<US$2975):
Brazil, Chile, Chinese Taipei, Costa Rica, Koreal, Malaysia, Mexico, Sin-
gapore and South Africa
• 2 countries were considered Upper Middle Income (US$2976<Y C<US$9205):
Argentina and Venezuela
• No country reached High Income (YC> US$9206).
• the KY ratio was not very dissimilar across income group being 1.7<KY <1.9
while ﬁnancial development was quite hetherogeneous being 14%<CR<25%
with Lower Middle income countries showing the highest CR.
Forty-one years later some miracles and catastrophes have hit the universe
of the sample countries. The main miracle is that only three countries, namely
Ghana, India and Senegal, are below the US$745 income poverty line in 2001.
The same three countries, however, still show a CR similar to that of Lower
Middle Income back in 1961! Also, 6 countries (4 Asian and 2 African) are now
in the Lower Middle Income group, 8 in the Upper Middle Income Group (all
of them South American with the exception of Malaysia and South Africa) and
the 3 Asian Tigers are in the High Income Group.
Ghana represents the ”economic development” catastrophe par excellence
given that it is the only country with a negative average annual growth of KY
in the whole sample. Senegal and Venezuela show a negative average annual
growth of YC but in no country the misfunctioning of the economy seem to
have gone so deep as to touch the accumulation process as in Ghana.
Mexico represents the ”ﬁnancial development” catastrophe as it is the only
country where ﬁnancial development is decreasing over the sample period.
End-of-period values of economic and ﬁnancial development seem to be more
closely clustered as CR and KY mostly grow with income. CR in Low Income
countries does not go beyond 30%, while in Lower Middle Income countries
starts at 36% except for Indonesia and in High Income countries starts above
100%! Higher Middle Income countries remain a bit of a problem in so far as
their end-of-period CR remains low (starting from 11%) and also ends at 69% if
it were not for the two non-Latin American countries in the group. Yet another
clear evidence of the need of dummy variables for crisis-prone countries such as
the Latin American ones.
KY pattern goes along the same lines with Low and Lower Middle Income
countries in the 2.3<KY <3 area. Higher Middle Income countries again show
some problems since two countries, Chile and Costa Rica, have a lower KY than
the best Lower Middle income and again the two non-Latin American countries
in the group fare better than their peers.
High Income countries’ KY starts at 2.6. At ﬁrst sight it seems diﬃcult
to reconcile Chinese Taipei’s reputation of (pre-1997) ”Asian Tiger” and the
lowest KY at the end of the period. The recent diﬃculties of Taiwanese banks5,
5In August 2001 the Resolution Trust Commission was set up with a capital of TWD 14bn
(euro 4.62 bn) to bail out all insolvent institutions. In May 2003 the government asked the
8however, seem to give credit both to the importance of the KY indicator for
”sound” ﬁnancial development and the exceptionally of Taiwan among High
Income countries.
3.2 The need of proper consideration for dummy variables
With the exception of China, Chinese Taipei, India and Singapore the average
country in the sample has experienced more than 10 years of either banking
crisis and/or some form of default in loans or bonds during the sample period6.
Given that these shocks aﬀects a subset of the variables (mainly CR and RR
usually asymmetrically), and the eﬀect will hardly disappear in the cointegration
relation, dummies should be included for nearly all countries.
The heavy use of such ad hoc dummy variables is also justiﬁed by Loayza and
Ranciere (2002) who ﬁnd them essential in order to obtain results for countries
subject to the eﬀect of ﬁnancial crisis longer than the average economic cycle.
They observe that ”in the case of private credit its correlation with growth
is strongly negative prior to the crisis, and it becomes close to neutral in the
aftermath”. This eﬀect is at odds with the long run nature of cointegration
results and therefore needs proper consideration.
On the other hand, the usual practice to detect outlying observations from
the estimated residuals in cointegrated VAR and to include unrestriced (inno-
vational) dummies to whiten residuals, has no sound justiﬁcation in theory.
More precisely, if there is a ﬁxed number of outliers asymptotic distributions
of estimates are unaﬀected and hence inference in the cointegration model is un-
changed. But in ﬁnite samples distortionary eﬀects could be relevant especially
if outliers are not of the innovational but are additive instead. This should not







0t + Dt + µ0 + εt (3.1)
where Yt is the vector of the endogenous variables in levels, k the lags (of the
unrestricted, i.e. level, model), t the (eventual) time trend and Dt the dummy
















Γi∆Yt−i + θi∆Dt +
k−1 X
i=0
θi∆Dt−i + µ0 + εt
(3.2)
Parliament to increase the fund’s budget allocation to TWD 540 bn (euro 17.5 bn) only to
recapitalise insolvent banks. The latest proposal is still undergoing parliamentary debate.






θi = −Γiθ for i =1 ,...,k − 1
where θ is the k-dimensional vector of parameters for the full lag structure
of the dummy variables.
Please note that an additive impulse dummy eliminates the contribution
from the observation to the likelihood function rather that the contribution
from the residual.
In order to prevent a dangerously excessive use or deliberate misuse the
objective detection and estimation procedure pioneered by Bohn Nielsen (2003)
[BN03 from now] has been used.
4 Cointegration estimation
Before proceding with the estimation of the cointegrated VAR model7 for each
country, the stationarity of the series is checked with a (non reported) standard
Augmented Dickey fuller test. Hence the following procedure has been followed:
1. Assume an order of cointegration and obtain lag length tests for the pro-
posed VAR with no dummies;
2. Detect and estimate the type and the position of dummy variables with
BN03 procedure;
3. Re-assess lag length and order of integration and proceed with identifying
restrictions.
The ﬁrst two steps are particularly crucial: on the one hand the lag, trend
and order of cointegration are to be assumed and then held ﬁxed for all the
iterations needed for the outlier detection and estimation procedure and on the
other hand these parameters - especially the lag length - may diﬀer when the
model is estimated with or without the dummies.
4.1 Lag choice
The lag, in no case higher than four in order not to limit degrees of freedom
in the estimation of parameters excessively, has been chosen according to a
hierarchy of criteria. First of all, as suggested by Johansen-Mosconi-Nielsen
(2000), the Hannan-Quinn criterion has been tried, then lag suggested by other
information tests, shown in the ﬁve coloumns on the left-hand section of table
3, are considered. If no meaningful result has been obtained this way, the lag
showing better normality of residuals, as suggested by the last four coloumns
7All calculations have been conducted in EViews R °. Codes for estimating the model can
be obtained from the author.
10of table 3, has been used instead. Evidence of the signiﬁcance of the lag choice
is oﬀered by the (poor) results in the BN03 procedure applied to Indonesia,
Singapore and South Africa where a more appealing interpretation of coeﬃcients
has suggested a lag choice alien to the one suggested by the tests.
[Table 3: Choice of the Lag Length here]
Table 3 shows for each country all the results of the lag length tests. For
each country the ﬁrst row of results represents tests calculated with no dummies
and the second row tests calculated at the end of the BN03 procedure, as shown
in tables 4.1-4.6. With the exception of Korea and Malaysia the inclusion of
dummies always increases the preferred lag. In 5 cases the HQ-after-dummies
has been the favoured choice and in 2 cases the HQ-before-dummies. A two-lag
model has been the most frequent choice, being estimated for 12 countries. The
use of four-lag model, particularly consuming in terms of degrees of freedom,
has been limited to two countries and this is just one of the advantages of the
BN03 procedure.
4.2 Outlier Detection & Estimation
The main steps of the iterative procedure can be outlined as follows:
1. Calculate residuals from Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) with lag
order and cointegration rank assumed in table 3 with no dummy (VECM0
from now on) and pick out data where residuals are higher than twice the
standard deviation (i.e. outliers)
2. Calculate the VECM0’s statistic t0 = −n
2 lg|Ω0| where |Ω0| is the determi-
nant of the residuals’ covariance matrix and n the number of observations
3. For the Innovation Outlier (IO) estimation insert an unrestricted dummy
variable at the observed outlier’s date (year) and, using the same cointe-
gration rank and alag order of VECM0 calculate tIO,year = −n
2 lg|ΩIO|
4. Obtain the likelihood ratio test τIO,year = −2 ∗ (t0 − tIO,year)
5. Repeat for all the outlying observations and order the test results in de-
scending order
6. For the Additive Outlier (AO) start assuming θ = 0 and follow the itera-
tion algorithm for Maximum Likelihood estimation in par 3.1 of BN03
7. Once covergence, say at at θ
∗, is reached, obtain the likelihood estimation
of (3.2) and the likelihood ratio test τAO,year = −2 ∗ (t0 − tAO,year)
8. Repeat for all the outlying dates and order the test results in descending
order
119. Insert a dummy at the observation where max
year τi i = AO, IO and estimate
aV E C Mm o d e l( V E C M dd)
10. Repeat the routine with VECMdd=VECM0 with the highest test value
until no signiﬁcant test values remain.
The value of the τIO,year and τAO,year tests for outliers in t h es i n g l ec o u n t r i e s
are shown in tables 4.1-4.6.
[Tables 4.1-4.6: Outlier Detection & Estimation here]
Iteration 0 is carried out on all observations with a standardised residual
higher than 2, subsequent iterations pick the highest-test year (thick-bordered
in the table) and insert a innovation or additive dummy in that year. The critical
value, below which no further dummy is included in the model, is χ2
.9995(5) and
it is calculated focusing on the fact that the highest value statistics is chosen.
[Table 5: Dummy Variables and Crisis Patterns
and Graphs 1 & 2 here]
The rationale of the BN03 procedure can be assessed by comparing tables
4.1-4.6 with table 5 and graphs 1 & 2, where parsimoniousness of the dummies
used in BN03 v. the years of crisis reported by the literature is striking. Table
5a n dt h eg r a p h ss h o wt h a t ,a c c o r d i n gt od i ﬀerent literature sources, the prob-
ability that in a random year in the sample period no country was in a crisis
is 34%, that one country was in a crisis 12%. Also the ”worst case scenario”
would be to be one country in the sample in the years 1988 or 1989: then the
probability that you would be in a crisis is, stunningly, 60%!!!! To name-and-
shame Argentina and Indonesia, closely followed by Mexico, make it to the top
of crisis-prone countries.
According to the BN03 approach, the might with which such ﬁnancial quakes
have hit the sample panel and the width of their eﬀects come out much curtailed.
Along with the results of the iterations, the probability that in a random year
in the sample period no country was in a crisis is 22%, that one country was in
a crisis 24%. The probability of crisis of 2 or 3 countries together is still double
digit but dies down afterwards and abruptly stops at 7. In other words, crisis,
as detected by the BN03 procedure, seem to be much less infectious than in
the literature-source world. Also the ”worst case scenario” would be to be one
country in the sample in year 1974: then the probability that a randomly chosen
country would be in a crisis is a less shattering 35%. This does not surprise when
one considers that in the Seventies 17 countries had average negative real interest
rates - a frequently-cited indicator of economic and/or ﬁnancial diﬃculties of
12some sort - comparing with 6 in the Sixties, 5 in the Eighties and 4 in the
Nineties. In this new scenario Brazil and Ghana lead the crisis-prone countries
hit list.
[Graph 3 here]
Please note that two notoriously crisis-prone countries with shorter times
series available and a heavy lag structure, namely Indonesia and Mexico, have
produced intelligible cointegration results thanks to the parsimonious BN03
procedure. Also the estimation of the CRseries for China, speciﬁed in Appendix
B, does not seem to have distorted the panel pattern, given that the outliers
identiﬁed by the BN03 procedure are 1967-1970 and 1993 (the double-digit
inﬂation and the FEC8 uniﬁcation with the renminbi).
4.3 Cointegration results
Table 6 shows the eignevalues and the cointegration test with two models with
either i) intercepts in the cointegrating equations and no deterministic trends in
the level data or ii) intercepts in the cointegrating equations and linear trends
in the level data.
[Table 6: Eigenvalues and Cointegration Test here]
All countries support at least 2 cointegrating equations - ﬁnancial depth
relationship and output relationship from here on - at least at 1% conﬁdence -
according critical values from J.A. Doornik (1998) - with the except Malaysia.
The identiﬁcation of parameters has proceeded imposing the following re-
strictions:
1. Normalisation: CR equation represents the link between ﬁnancial devel-
opment and economic development and YC equation represent the pro-
duction functionV β1,1 = β2,1 =1
2. CR equation is linked to KY : β1,2 = −β1,3
3. one of the cointegrating equation is not negatively inﬂuenced either by
RR or by OP9
8The renminbi was massively overvalued in the 1980s and early 1990s, and a parallel
currency, foreign-exchange certiﬁcates (FECs), circulated until 1994 to enable entities engaged
in foreign trade to purchase foreign exchange at a more reasonable rate. The currencies were
uniﬁed in 1994 and the renminbi pegged at Rmb 8.7:US$1. The average exchange rate in 1993
was Rmb 5.8:US$1.
9In practical terms this means testing one of the following restrictions a) b1,4 =0 ,b )
b2,4 = 0; c) interest rates is positively linked either with CR or YC i.e. (b1,5 + b2,5)=
(b1,5unrestricted + b2,5unrestricted)o rb1,5 =0o rb2,5 =0o rbi,5 =0i fb¯ ı,5unrestricted where
i =1 ,2w h e n¯ ı =2 ,1 is near zero
13Should the above restrictions give out equations that cannot be meaningfully
interpreted the speciﬁcation where capital does not enter the ﬁnancial develop-
ment equation,i.e. β1,2 =0 , has been estimated instead of nr.2.
[Table 7: Parameter Overidentifying Restrictions here]
The results in table 7 show for each country the speciﬁcation, among those
obtainable with the above restrictions and the identiﬁed dummies10,w i t ht h e
highest χ2(1) probability associated with the overidentifying restriction test.
Chinese Taipei and South Africa, given the (poor) quality of the data already
shown in A2-A6 tables, only manage to get restrictions signiﬁcative at 1% level.
A few common elements seem to emerge. First of all, only in ﬁve cases,
namely Brazil, China, Chinese Taipei, Costa Rica and Thailand the β1,2 =0
model of ﬁnancial intermediation is the preferred identiﬁcation choice rather
than the KY speciﬁcation (β1,2 = −β1,3). With the exception of Chinese
Taipei, whose recent diﬃculties in the banking sector have already been men-
tioned, all these countries are concentrated in Lower or Upper Middle income
group and Brazil and is also the heaviest dummy-laden countries. |β1,2| ranges
seem roughly to increase with income with 0.1 < |β1,2|Low < 0.58, 0.04 <
|β1,2|LowerMid < 0.76, and 0.09 < |β1,2|UpperMid < 0.98, at least until the Up-
per Middle income level.
Secondly, there are six negative contributions of ﬁnancial openness to ﬁnan-
cial development: two among ”fairly liberal” countries (i.e. RFE < 2), namely
Mexico and Morocco and four among ”ﬁnancially closed” countries, namely
Brazil, Egypt, India and Venezuela. The two control countries, Costa Rica and
Senegal, show a positive sign.
No High Income country, all of them with RFE > 2, show a negative con-
tribution of openness to ﬁnancial development and so do Low Income ones with
the exception of India, which is however saddled with 5 crisis dummies. History
of crisis for Brazil and Venezuela, and special trends in variables in Egypt (the
only country in the sample with decreasing OP) rather than long-term relation-
ship might be the reasons for β1,4 < 0. If,on the other hands, one considers
caveats for the poor quality of estimations for South Africa, there is a weak
evidence that ”ﬁnancial openness is bad for growth” especially in the Middle
I n c o m eg r o u pw i t hM o r o c c oa n dM e x i c o supporting the evidence. The evalua-
tion of China’s RFE to 3, i.e. fairly restrictive, seems therefore to be justiﬁed,
given the resulting positive contribution of ﬁnancial openness to to ﬁnancial
development. Such assessment is less clear cut for Chinese Taipei, which suﬀers
from already mentioned data and signiﬁcance problems.
Thirdly, although table A6 unequivocally warns against the good quality of
RR data, in terms of statistical properties such as normality, one cannot fail to
10Only in the case of Morocco and South Africa less dummies than those identiﬁed with
the BN03 procedure have been used. IO at 1974 and 1986 have been used for Morocco and
IO at 1974 and 1988 for South Africa.
14observe that 12 out of 20 countries show a non negative β1,5 and three countries
show a β1,5 < 0∩β2,5 < 0. The only countries with β1,5 > 0∩β2,5 > 0a r eC h i n a ,
Chinese Taipei and Korea, all considered ”tigers” in terms of development with
Egypt joining the group.
As far as the economic development cointegrating vector is concerned, ”big”
economies, i.e. Argentina, Brazil, China and India are the nearest one to the
endogenous growth condition β2,3 → 1. KC always gives a signiﬁcative and pos-
itive contribution with the exception of Ghana, Morocco, Senegal and Venezuela.
OP is nearly always signiﬁcative and it is also positive with the exception of
Brazil, India, Morocco, Senegal and Venezuela. Considering that Brazil and
India are among the closest countries in the sample, with the trade/GDP ra-
tio barely above 15%, Egypt11 is the only African country able to escape the
”African curse” whereby neither KC nor OP are able to account for develop-
ment (or, rather, lack thereof). The fact that Chile shows a record of β2,4 ≈ 1,
might be due more to a compensation to the low β2,3 than to a long-term feature
itself.
Finally,the evidence on the contribution to the economic development equi-
librium relationship by β2,5 is quite clear-cut, with only Argentina, China, Chi-
nese Taipei, Egypt, Korea and Venezuela showing a positive contribution from
RR.
5 Concluding Remarks
The contribution that this paper aims to oﬀer is a qualiﬁcation of the link
between ﬁnancial and economic development with reference to restrictions to
the role of ﬁnancial openness.
Therefore, a link between economic and ﬁnancial development has been
tested for 20 sample countries especially selected from a set of ﬁnancially open
economies underwriters of the GATS protocol of the WTO. Financial openness
has been proxied by the product of trade openness times an inverse function of
the restrictiveness of foreign establishment indicator.
For China and Chinese Taipei, being the newest WTO members, the foreign
restrictiveness indicator has been assessed from their own protocol of admission
to the WTO. For China the ﬁnancial development indicator, i.e. the credit/GDP
ratio for years 1961-1976 has also been estimated from data on growth rate of
loans to enterprises stated in the relevant ﬁve-year plans.
Furthermore, in order to come to terms with crisis periods in the time series
a special detection and estimation procedure has been used to place dummies.
This procedure has proved extremely conducive to results insofar as it is parsi-
monious in terms of degrees of freedom and quite precise, as exempliﬁed by the
interpretation of the case of China.
11with South Africa, whose bad quality of data and estimation results have already been
mentioned
15In line with the literature reviewed, the results of this paper seem to conﬁm
a non linear relationship between ﬁnancial development and accumulation i.e. ¯ ¯β1,2
¯ ¯ values seem to increase with income at least until Upper Middle Income
group. Non-linearity seems to be characterising ﬁnancial development too. The
KY speciﬁcation of the ﬁnancial development cointegrating equation is preferred
in all but ﬁve cases, namely Brazil, China, Chinese Taipei, Costa Rica and
Thailand. With the exception of Chinese Taipei (banking diﬃculties) all these
countries are concentrated in Lower or Upper Middle income group and Brazil
is also the heaviest dummy-laden countries.
There is also weak evidence for ﬁnancial openness being bad for growth as
shown by β1,4 < 0 in Morocco and Mexico. Exceptions suﬀer from poor quality
either of estimation (South Africa) or of data (Ghana). Argentina also shows a
positive correlation but with a very low value. No High Income country, all of
them ﬁnancially closed (i.e. RFE>2), show a negative contribution of openness
to ﬁnancial development and so do Low Income ones with the exception of India,
which is however saddled with 5 crisis dummies. Financially closed Brazil and
Venezuela and Egypt have β1,4 < 0 but the former two are heavy with crises
dummies and Egypt is the only country in the sample with decreasing OP.
In line with Aretsis-Demetriades-Fattouh-Mouratidis (2002) the model ﬁnds
positive eﬀect of real interest rate on ﬁnancial development for most countries.
Finally, as far as the economic development is concerned ”big” economies,
i.e. Argentina, Brazil, China and India are the nearest ones to the endogenous
growth condition β2,3 −→ 1. KC nearly always gives a signiﬁcative and pos-
itive contribution to economic development and so does OP except in Ghana,
Morocco and Senegal. Egypt and South Africa, are hence the only African
countries able to escape the ”African curse” whereby neither KC nor OP are
able to account for development (or, rather, lack thereof).
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18A Data Desciption
Table A1: Variables and Sources12
Variable Description Source
CR Credit to private sec-
tor/GDP
WDI0313
YC Real income per capita in
1995 US$
Ratio of real income to
population from WDI0314
KC Real capital stock per




OP Composite ﬁnancial open-
ness indicator = open-
ness*rescaled RFE
openness in con-




RR Real interest rate = Dis-




KY Capital-income ratio KC/YC
12I would like to thank the Central Bank of China, Nicholas Kwan (HKMA) and Cesar
M.Calderon (Central Bank of Chile) for their help in providing data.
13Chinese Taipei: Central Bank of China. China 1961-1977: see Appendix B
14Chinese Taipei 1961-98: PWT6.1, 1999-01 calculated with growth rate from nominal
income per capita from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Monthly
Statistics, Taiwan District, Republic of China [TW-MonStat]
15calculated with Easterly - Levine (2001) perpetual inventory formula.
16Taiwan: 1999-2001 Rescaled [Imp(line98c)+exp(90c)]/gdp(99b) from [TW-MonStat]
17Rescaled RFE =[1+(6-original RFE)/5]; Rescaled RFE =1 if original RFE not ranked;
Rescaled RFE =2.2 if original RFE = 0 [minimum restrictions]; Rescaled RFE =1.4 if
original RFE = 4 [maximum restriction]
18Argentina: 1961-1967 and 1974-1976: Tasas de interes vencidas abonadas por depositos
ap l a z oﬁjio, en bancos diciembre; 1968-1973: Tasas de interes abonadas a los investitores en
el mercato de aceptaciones diciembre from Memoria Anual - Banco Central de la Republica
Argentina, various years. Brazil: money market rate. Chile: interest on short run loans
from Cesar Calderon Banco Central de Chile. China: 1961-1978 annual rate on demand
deposit as calculated from monthly interest rate from table 10 pag 154 of W. A. Byrd (1983).
Chinese Taipei: Rediscount rate from the Central Bank of China. Korea 1961-66: real
interest rate from Luintel-Khan (1999). Indonesia 1965-1969: Lowest regulated interest rate
for credit from the Report of Bank Indonesia, various years. Singapore 1961-72: Malaysia’s
money market rate. Mexico 1965-1976: Annual interest rate of Bonos hipotecarios ordinarios
in December from: Indicatores Economicos - Banco de Mexico, various years; 1977 onwards
deposit rate WDI03. Thailand 1961-76: real interest rate from Luintel-Khan (1999).
19Brazil: annual percentage growth of the FGV Index from Banco Central do Brazil.
China 1961-1969: regression with the rate of growth of the Gross Value Added in Industry
19[Tables A2-A6 here]
B Domestic Credit on GDP (CHCR) for China
in 1961-197620
Domestic credit for China in the period 1961-1976 has been calculated applying
the average yearly growth rate of loans to enterprises from table 2 page 138 (gr)
of W. Byrd (1983) to:
1. initial working capital loans in 1957 (L57) as estimated on page 125 of
K. Hsiao (1971) + Investment in Fixed assets funded by domestic loans
(FX) of coloumn 3 of table on page 25 of Department of Statistics on
Investment in Fixed Assets National Bureau of Statistics of China (2002)
and to
2. the level of bank loans in 1980 by table 2 page 27 K. Hsiao (1984).
So the ﬁnal formula sums the (forward) smoothed working capital loans from
1957 and the (backward) smoothed bank loans from 1980
CHCRyear =[ fyear + hyear]/(2 ∗ nominalGDPyear)
where
fyear = gr(L57)year + FXyear
hyear = gr−1 (L80)year
in Table B.3. of Maddison (1998) as independent variable. Ghana 1961-64: calculated from
a regression of the diﬀerence of real and nominal GDP growth rates from WDI03.
20A special thank you goes to Jinming Luo and Liu Yuntao, students at the Master in
International Management for China at CeFiMS, for the precious help I got in consulting
Chinese language sources
20